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I. Introduction
Several recent high-profile instances of cyberbullying and online 
impersonation have prompted state legislatures across the country to 
 J.D. Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  The author 
would like to thank her parents, Pat and Jane Malone, for their superhuman patience and 
unyielding support on not only this Note, but all her endeavors. 
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take action against this real and growing problem.1  But like all 
attempts to regulate use of the internet, laws governing online 
communication must carefully tread the line between protecting 
individuals from harm and respecting freedom of speech.  On January 
1, 2011, California Senate Bill 1411 (now codified at section 528.5 of 
the Penal Code) went into effect, creating civil and criminal liability 
for “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly 
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web 
site or by other electronic means for purposes of harming, 
intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person.”2  Shortly 
before the statute went into effect, the bill’s author, California State 
Senator Joe Simitian, D-Palo Alto, sent out a press release explaining 
his motivations in writing the bill: “E-personation is the dark side of 
the social networking revolution. Facebook or MySpace pages, e-
mails, texting and comments on Web forums have been used to 
humiliate or torment people and even put them in danger . . . Until 
now, there really has been no deterrent.”3 
The issue was brought to Senator Simitian’s attention by Carl 
Guardino, a constituent and the president and chief executive officer 
of the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, which represents several 
local technology companies.4  Three years ago, someone created a 
fake email address for Guardino and used it to send malicious notes, 
harshly criticizing the work of the recipients, to Guardino’s 
professional contacts.5  In May 2010, a crude email was sent to a local 
reporter from a fake Guardino account.6  The perpetrator of either 
1. Examples include: 18-year-old Tyler Clementi of New Jersey (who was outed as
gay by his roommate on the Internet), 15-year-old Billy Lucas of Indiana (who hanged 
himself after continued bullying from his peers about his sexuality), and 13-year-old Asher 
Brown of Texas (who shot himself after years of abuse online), and 13-year-old Megan 
Meirs of Missouri (who hanged herself after the being bullied by the mother of a peer 
through a fake MySpace account). 
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (Deering 2012). The crime is a misdemeanor, and
penalties are similar to those for other forms of impersonation (i.e., a fine of up to $1,000 
and/or up to one year in jail).  CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(d) (Deering 2012).  The bill also 
allows victims to pursue compensation in civil court.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(e) 
(Deering 2012). 
3. Malicious E-Personation Protection Effective January 1,  STATE SENATOR JOE
SIMITIAN (Dec. 22, 2010) http://www.senatorsimitian.com/entry/malicious_e-personation_ 
protection_effective_january_1/ (hereinafter Simitian I). 
4. Maggie Shiels, California Looks to Outlaw Online Impersonation, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2010, 7:49 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11045070. 
5. Andrea Koskey, New Year Brings New Law Targeting Cyberbullying, SAN
FRANCISCO EXAMINER (Dec. 31, 2010, 5:00 AM) http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2010 
/12/new-year-brings-new-law-targeting-cyberbullying#ixzz1ca6vKWdX. 
6. Shiels, supra note 5.
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action has not been caught.7  Guardino told the local paper, “It could 
have ruined my reputation . . . Luckily, [the e-mail recipients] know 
me well enough to know that e-mail was out of character.”8  A more 
outrageous example is that of Guardino’s brother, a science teacher 
on the Monterrey peninsula.  Someone created a fake Yahoo email 
address and Facebook account, and used them to make it seem as 
though Guardino’s brother was mocking a disabled student.9  When 
Guardino’s brother went to the District Attorney and the County 
Sheriff for help, they told him there was nothing they could do under 
existing state law.10 
At first glance, the e-personation statute seems perfectly 
reasonable: It is short, filled with good intentions, and just applies 
existing harassment, intimidation and fraud laws to the relatively 
recent medium of the Internet.11  However, a more thorough read 
exposes the fallacy of this view and reveals serious reasons for 
concern.  For one thing, the existing statute does not expressly 
exclude acts that might be performed through use of the Internet, so 
there is nothing to suggest that the law would not apply in that 
context.12  Additionally, the phrase “for the purpose of harming . . . 
another person” is incredibly broad and could easily be construed 
such that it would criminalize protected speech.  Moreover, there is 
no objective explanation of what it means to “credibly impersonate” 
another actual person.  While there is clearly a core of behavior that 
is not protected, that behavior is already prohibited by several 
existing and long-standing statutory and common law causes of 
action, with well-developed bodies of case law behind them to guide 
police, prosecutors, judges, and juries in enforcing them. 
7. Koskey, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Julie Gottlieb, California Criminalizes Online Impersonation (E-personation),
SOCIAL MEDIA NEWS (April 1, 2011) http://socialmedialawnews.com/2011/01/04/ 
california-criminalizes-online-impersonation-e-personation/;  see also Shiels, supra note 5. 
10. Shiels, supra note 5.
11. Larry Downes, The Fallacy of “E-personation” Laws, LARRYDOWNES.COM
(June 11, 2010) http://larrydownes.com/the-fallacy-of-%E2%80%9Ce-personation% 
E2%80%9 D-laws/. 
12. Bill Analysis of S.B. 1411 (as amended May 11, 2010), Assembly Committee on
Judiciary, June 29, 2010, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_ 
cfa_20100628_112759_asm_comm.html; “For purposes of this chapter, ‘personal 
identifying information’ means any . . . unique electronic data including information 
identification number assigned to the person, address or routing code, telecommunication 
identifying information or access device.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (Deering 2012). 
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Essentially, the crux of the problem with this law is that the 
authors, aware that technology evolves faster than any legislative 
body can hope to stay abreast of, wrote the bill so that it is 
simultaneously both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.13  
Consequently, it does not address much of the cyberbullying behavior 
it is intended to deter but has the potential to be abused by over-
zealous prosecutors and litigious plaintiffs with otherwise weak cases. 
In other words, this statute will be largely ineffective at best, and a 
tool to chill speech at worst.  With the enactment of this bill, 
California now takes its place among such stalwart defenders of free 
speech as  Morocco14 and India,15 both of whom have arrested their 
citizens for creating Facebook pages for others.   
While there are several problems with California’s new e-
personation statute, this Note will primarily focus on the implications 
for traditionally protected speech resulting from the potential 
overbreadth of the phrase “for the purpose of harming . . . another 
person” and vagueness of the standards for “credibly impersonate.” 
Part II of this Note will provide background on the overbreadth and 
vagueness doctrines in Constitutional law, and will review several 
existing causes of action that are analogous or related to section 528.5 
to show that there is already a well-established body of law in 
California prohibiting the behavior that the e-personation statute is 
intended to deter.  Part III will analyze the core language of the e-
personation law and show that it is impermissibly broad and vague, 
potentially lowering the threshold for legitimate causes of action such 
that enforcement of the law would criminalize or subject to civil 
litigation speech that has traditionally been protected by the First 
Amendment.  Part IV will attempt to provide some guidance on how 
the language should be constructed by reviewing courts (or, ideally, 
amended by the legislature) to narrow and more clearly define the 
vague and ambiguous statutory language.  Part V will conclude that 
even with narrowing the offending language to limit the statute’s 
application to protected speech, the bill covers exactly the same kind 
of conduct that is already covered by existing statutes, and that the 
behavior at which this statute is directed is best regulated by the 
private platforms on which it is conducted.   
13.  Downes, supra note 12.
14. Facebook Fraudster “Stole Prince’s ID”, CNN.com (Feb. 7, 2008, 8:52 AM)
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/02/07/morocco.identiity/index.html. 
15. 1 Arrested For Fake Face Book Profile of Rudy, NEWS4U.CO.IN (April 28, 2010)
http://news4u.co.in/2010/04/1-arrested-for-fake-face-book-profile-of-rudy/. 
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II. Background
A. Constitutional Challenges
The First Amendment prohibits unreasonable restrictions on
speech by the federal government,16 and applies to state governments 
through incorporation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17  Attacks on a statute’s constitutionality are either 
facial challenges or as-applied challenges. To prevail in a facial 
challenge, a plaintiff must establish that the legislation is always, and 
under all circumstances, unconstitutional; if successful, the court will 
strike the statute down entirely. Sometimes, a court will reject a facial 
challenge but insinuate that an as-applied challenge could prevail.18  
To succeed in an as-applied challenge, a plaintiff must show that a 
statute is unconstitutional when applied to a particular situation; if 
successful, the court will narrow the circumstances in which the 
statute may constitutionally be applied without striking it down.   
1. Vagueness Doctrine
The vagueness doctrine, rooted in due process, states that a given
statute is unenforceable and facially invalid if persons of “common 
intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ as to its 
application”; in other words, a law is too vague when an average 
citizen cannot generally determine what persons are regulated, what 
conduct is prohibited or required, or what punishment may be 
imposed.19  It protects an individual’s right to live free from fear or the 
chilling effect of unpredictable prosecution, and limits the discretion 
of the state to initiate criminal prosecutions and selectively enforce 
laws.20  The Supreme Court has held that a law threatening 
fundamental First Amendment rights demands a higher degree of 
clarity than a statute that does not threaten a constitutionally 
protected right.21 However, where a statute could apply to both 
16. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. 
17. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
18. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
19. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
20. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
21. Keyishian v Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 509–10 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
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protected and unprotected conduct, and the law’s valuable effects 
outweigh its potential general harm, a court will strike it down only as 
applied.22  Vagueness does not always lead to a determination of 
invalidity—courts may cure a vagueness problem that appears on the 
face of the statute through a clarifying judicial interpretation.  
2. Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine states that a statute is overly broad
(and facially invalid) if, in banning unprotected conduct, it also 
proscribes protected conduct.23 Specifically, the doctrine seeks to 
“strike a balance” between two “competing social costs”:24  The 
“harmful effects” of “invalidating a law that in some of its 
applications is perfectly constitutional,” and the possibility that “the 
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from 
engaging in constitutionally protected speech.”25  Given the likelihood 
of chilled speech under an overly broad law, the doctrine allows third 
party standing on the ground that the statute violates others’ First 
Amendment rights.26  Because almost any law regulating speech (even 
when the vast majority of prohibited speech is not protected by the 
First Amendment) will seem to potentially reach some protected 
speech, “the overbreadth of the statute must not only be real but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep” for a court to invalidate it.27  Demonstrating 
substantial overbreadth invalidates all enforcement of that law, until a 
limiting construction or partial invalidation (deletion of the 
impermissibly broad part of the law from the remainder of the 
statute) narrows it to eliminate the threat to protected expression.28 
To determine whether a statute’s overbreadth is substantial, 
courts consider a statute’s application to real-world conduct, not far-
22. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). 
23. Lewis Sargentich first analyzed and named the doctrine in his famous note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, (1970). The Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized the doctrine in 1973. 
24. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 483 (1989), and
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 411 (1992). 
27. Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612–13, (1973), citing Lewis Sargentich, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, (1970). 
28. Canatella v. Stovitz, 365 F.Supp.2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2005), (citing Virgina v. Hicks,
539 U.S. 113 (2003)). 
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fetched conjectural situations.29 Accordingly, courts have repeatedly 
emphasized that an overbreadth claimant bears the burden of 
demonstrating, “from the text of [the law] and from actual fact” that 
substantial overbreadth exists.30  Similarly, there must be a “realistic 
danger” that the statute itself will “significantly compromise 
recognized First Amendment protections of third parties” to be 
facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.31 
B. Alternative Causes of Action Available
There are several statutory and common law causes of action in
California that are related to e-personation. False impersonation, 
identity theft, defamation, intentional misrepresentation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, rights of privacy (misappropriation of 
likeness or name, right of publicity, and false light) all have elements 
or conceptual similarities to the e-personation statute, and are 
summarized below. 
1. False Personation
California’s false personation law makes it a crime to falsely
assume the identity of another person in order to cause harm to the 
other person or to gain personal benefit, by subjecting the 
impersonated party to financial loss or civil and criminal liability.32 
This definition necessarily implies that the person impersonated is a 
real person and not a fictitious one (even if the individual is 
deceased).33  To be violate the statute, the impersonator must, in 
addition to pretending to be someone, either receive money or 
29. See, e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 301–02.
30. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 153.
31. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
(1984). 
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (Deering 2012).
33. Lee v. Super. Ct., 989 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Cal. 2000).
Pen. Code, § 529, by referring to impersonation of “another,”
contemplates impersonation of a real or actual (as opposed to fictitious)
person; it does not follow, however, that a deceased person is not a real
or actual person for purposes of Pen. Code, § 529. Statutes prohibiting
impersonation have two purposes: preventing harm to the person falsely
represented, and ensuring the integrity of judicial and governmental
processes. Both purposes are furthered by construing Pen. Code, § 529,
as applying to impersonation of a deceased person as well as of a living
person, and both would be frustrated by a contrary interpretation of the
statute.
Id. 
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property intended for the individual so impersonated,34  subject the 
impersonated to “any suit or prosecution, or to pay any sum of 
money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any 
benefit might accrue to the party personating, or to any other 
person,”35 or “marry, or sustain a marriage relationship with 
another.”36  
In other words, for this statute to apply, an impersonator must 
wage intentional deception and commit one of the additional 
specified acts.37  For example, forging someone’s signature on a 
citation booking form or submitting to fingerprints while 
impersonating someone else is not a violation of this statute, because 
the impersonation was inextricably part of the action.38  False 
personation comes with a $10,000 fine, a year in prison, or both.39  
Because the statute requires an additional act beyond identifying 
oneself falsely there are two defenses: (1) the impersonator did not 
commit one of the specified additional acts, and (2) that the 
individual impersonated won’t be subject to any harm, and no one is 
benefitting from the impersonation.  However, the statute does not 
require an actual harm or benefit to have occurred, just the potential 
to create one.40 
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530 (Deering 2012).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529(a) (Deering 2012).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (Deering 2012).
37. People v. Rathert, P.3d 700, 707 (2000)
…[S]ection 529, paragraph 3 [California’s false impersonation law],
unlike public welfare offenses, does not dispense with a mental element.
One does not violate paragraph 3 merely by happening to resemble
another person. Rather, one must intentionally engage in a deception
that may fairly be described as noninnocent behavior, even if, in some
instances, it might not stem from an evil motive.
Id. 
38. These examples are taken from People v. Stacy, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 317 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010); People v. Cole, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); People v. 
Robertson, 273 Cal. Rptr. 209, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (overruled on other grounds). 
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528 (Deering 2012).
40. “. . .does any other act whereby, if done by the person falsely personated,
he might, in any event, become liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay any sum of 
money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture, or penalty, or whereby any benefit might accrue 
to the party personating, or to any other person.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (Deering 
2012) (emphasis added). 
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2. Identity Theft and Counterfeit Official Documents
Identity theft is the taking of another person’s personally
identifying information for use in a criminal or deceptive manner.41  
California’s identity theft statute allows for criminal charges when 
someone “willfully obtains personal identifiable information to use 
for any unlawful purpose,” including, but not limited to, “obtain[ing], 
or attempt[ing] to obtain, credit, goods, services, or medical 
information in the name of another person.”42  Specifically, the statute 
prohibits four types of identity theft: (1) intentionally obtaining 
someone’s personal identifying information and using that 
information for any unlawful purpose without that person’s consent;43  
(2) acquiring or retaining possession someone’s personal identifying
information (without his or her consent) with the intent to commit a
fraud; (3) selling, transferring, or providing a third party with
someone’s personal identifying information (without his or her
consent) with the intent to commit a fraud; and (4) selling,
transferring, or providing a third party with someone’s personal
identifying information (without his or her consent) with the actual
knowledge that the information will be used to commit a fraud.44
Somewhat appended to the identity theft law is a prohibition on 
the manufacture, sale, offer for sale, or transfer of any document 
purporting to be a government-issued identification card or driver’s 
license (but not amounting to counterfeit), which by virtue of the 
wording or appearance thereon could reasonably deceive an ordinary 
person into believing that it is issued by a government agency.45 
3. Defamation
In California, defamation (known as “libel” in written from, and
“slander” if uttered orally), is defined by both statute46 and case law.47  
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (Deering 2012).
42. Id.
43. California courts have found that “unlawful” does not only refer to criminal
activity, but to any act prohibited by some type of law—even a civil one such as 
defamation.  E.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (Deering 2012).  Here, the term “fraud” means a
deliberate act that is designed to (1) secure an unfair or unlawful gain, or (2) cause 
another person to suffer a loss, as in the false personation statute. 
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.5 (Deering 2012).
46. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44, 45(a), and 46 (Deering 2012).
47. See e.g., Cunningham v. Simpson, 461 P.2d 39, 42 (Cal. 1969); Bindrim v. Mitchell,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Noral v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 104 P.2d 860, 863 
(Cal. 1940); Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. 1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 577, 592, 564A, 580B (1977). 
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The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) publication to one other 
than the person defamed (2) of a false statement of fact which is 
understood as (3) being of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) has a 
natural tendency to injure the plaintiff’s reputation or which causes 
“special damage.”48  Public figures must additionally prove “actual 
malice.”49  As a matter of law, in cases involving public figures or 
matters of public concern, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
falsity in a defamation action.50  In cases involving matters of purely 
private figures concern, the burden of proving truth is on the 
defendant.51  One important aspect of a defamation case is whether a 
false statement about someone is likely to be believed.52  Jocular 
intent alone will not relieve the author/publisher of liability,53 but if 
the statement is too bizarre or hyperbolic to be credible, and readers 
will likely interpret it as a joke, then the suit is unlikely to succeed.54  
A private plaintiff is with a prima facie case of libel per se may 
presume damages,55 otherwise, the plaintiff must prove “special 
damages,” which are concrete, provable, and a direct result of the 
defamation.56  
48. Robert Kavanaugh, Elements of a Defamation Claim: 4-45 California Torts §
45.04, MATTHEW BENDER & CO., INC., 2011.  Last visited Nov. 7, 2011. 
49. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1969).
50. Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 786–90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (“whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by 
[the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record”). 
51. Smith v. Maldonado, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 403 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
52. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–54 (1988).
53. Arno v. Stewart, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Menefee v. Codman,
317 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Cal. 1957). 
54. Arno, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
55.
[T]he jury ‘also may award plaintiff presumed general damages.’
Presumed damages ‘are those damages that necessarily result from the
publication of defamatory matter and are presumed to exist. They
include reasonable compensation for loss of reputation, shame,
mortification, and hurt feeling. No definite standard or method of
calculation is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation
for presumed damages, and no evidence of actual harm is required.’
Sommer v. Gabor, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), (internal citations 
omitted);  see also 23 CAL. JUR. 3D DAMAGES § 171. Libel per se is the publication of a 
false statement about another which accuses him/her of a crime, immoral acts, inability to 
perform his/her profession, having a loathsome disease (like syphilis), or dishonesty in 
business.  Such claims are considered so obviously harmful that malice need not be proved 
to obtain a judgment for “general damages,” and not just specific losses. 
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a) (Deering 2012); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D DAMAGES § 152.
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4. Intentional Misrepresentation or “Fraud”
Under California law, wrongful actions can be characterized as
civil “fraud” under the theory of intentional misrepresentation.57  The 
general elements of a cause of action for fraud or deceit are (1) 
misrepresentation (in the form of false representation, concealment, 
or nondisclosure) of a material fact; (2) knowledge of falsity or lack of 
reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the representation 
(scienter); (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) actual and justifiable 
reliance by plaintiff; and (5) resulting damage.58  It is not enough that 
the victim was told a lie; the victim must also be able to prove some 
type of measurable damage resulted from the lie.59 
A false statement or omission is actionable only if the plaintiff’s 
reliance was justifiable or reasonable.60  The reasonableness of the 
reliance is ordinarily a question of fact. However, if reasonable minds 
can come to only one conclusion based on the facts, whether a party’s 
reliance was justified may be decided as a matter of law.61  Reliance is 
not justifiable if it is unreasonable in light of the plaintiff’s 
intelligence, experience, and business ventures.62  The test is whether 
or not it was reasonable under these particular circumstances for this 
particular plaintiff to have relied on the representation.63   
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 2012).
58. Peter R. J. Thompson, 3-40 California Torts § 40.02: Elements of Tort of Fraud or
Deceit, MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY, INC., 2011.  See Orient Handel v. United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 237 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Hackethal v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 
234 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572(1), (2), 
1710(1), (2) (Deering 2012); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. 1993) (actual 
reliance); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(justifiable reliance); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Keenan, 216 Cal. Rptr. 318, 334–35 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (knowledge of falsity, justifiable reliance); Hilliard v. A. H. Robins 
Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (knowledge of falsity); Hart v. Browne, 
163 Cal. Rptr. 356, 361–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (knowledge of falsity); Gold v. L.A. 
Democratic League, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (recklessness or lack of 
reasonable ground for belief in truth of representation). 
59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709 (Deering 2012); Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656,
662 (Cal. 1951). 
60. Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941); Hackethal, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 857;
Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
61. Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
62. Wagner, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 522; Winn v. McCulloch Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 597, 601
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see Chi. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. at 513. 
63. Kruse v. Bank of Am., 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (testimony
concerning one’s own reliance is legally insufficient if that reliance is without justification; 
plaintiff’s misguided belief in statement on which no reasonable person would rely was not 
justifiable). 
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As a general rule negligence of the plaintiff is no defense to an 
intentional tort .. . . Nor is a plaintiff held to the standard of 
precaution or of minimum knowledge of a hypothetical, 
reasonable man . . .. Exceptionally gullible or ignorant people 
have been permitted to recover from defendants who took 
advantage of them in circumstances where persons of normal 
intelligence would not have been misled . . . however, even an 
unsophisticated victim may not put faith in representations 
which are preposterous, or which are shown by facts within his 
observation to be so patently and obviously false that he must 
have closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the truth.64 
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
California has long recognized the right to recover damages for
the intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress (“IIED”). To 
win an IIED suit, plaintiff must prove: (1) outrageous conduct by the 
defendant; (2) that the defendant intended to cause, or recklessly 
disregarded of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) 
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress by the plaintiff; and (4) 
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 
defendant’s outrageous conduct.65 Consequently, a plaintiff may 
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress only when he 
or she has, in fact, suffered severe emotional distress.66 “Severe” 
emotional distress is that which is “substantial” or “enduring” as 
opposed to “trivial” or “transitory,”67 and has been defined as 
“emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality 
that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to 
endure it.”68  It may consist of “any highly unpleasant mental reaction 
such as fright, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, 
chagrin, disappointment or worry.”69  Both the intensity and the 
duration of the plaintiff’s emotional distress are factors to be 
considered in determining whether it is severe.70 
California was the first state (and one of the few) that allows 
monetary recovery for de minimus physical injury (i.e., unnecessary 
64. Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980–81 (Cal. 1941).
65. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g., Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal. 1970).
66. Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 71 (Cal. 1979).
67. Girard v. Ball, 178 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
68. Schild v. Rubin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
70. Id. at 90.
 2012] PARODY OR IDENTITY THEFT 287
medications and medical tests) if the outcome was foreseeable, and 
emotional distress alone (even in the absence of any physical injury to 
the plaintiff), in cases involving extreme and outrageous intentional 
invasions of one’s mental and emotional tranquility.71 
6. Invasion of Privacy Torts
Unlike a defamation claim, the invasion of privacy torts do not
protect a plaintiff’s interest in his or her reputation.  Instead, the 
wrong inflicted by an invasion of privacy is a direct injury to the 
plaintiff’s feelings and peace of mind, and compensation is awarded 
for that injury, not for loss of standing in the eyes of others.  There 
are four categories of privacy invasion: intrusion of solitude and 
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, misappropriation of name 
or likeness, and false light.  The latter two are relevant to this 
discussion. 
a. Misappropriation of Likeness or Name and Right of Publicity
Thirty years ago, California adopted Dean Prosser’s elements for
the tort of misappropriation of name or likeness:72 “(1) the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of 
plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or 
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”73  However, 
harm to the plaintiff is typically presumed as long as the first three 
elements are demonstrated.  Courts have held that any invasion of a 
legal right is an injury satisfying the fourth element, although without 
proof of material harm the plaintiff may only be entitled to nominal 
damages.74  In one case, a court held that any violation should be 
recoverable even if the injury was mental and subjective; therefore 
even the unauthorized use of a person’s name is an actionable 
invasion of the plaintiff’s rights (even if the injury was slight).75  In this 
vein, the law does not require that the unauthorized use or 
publication of a person’s name or picture suggest an endorsement or 
association with the injured person to be actionable.76  Likewise, 
71. State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 284–286 (Cal. 1952).
72. Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Super. Ct. of L.A. 1983).  See also
Prosser, LAW OF TORTS ß 117 (4th ed. 1971); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 
686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying California law). 
73. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347.  See also Prosser, LAW OF TORTS ß 117 (4th ed.
1971); Newcombe, 157 F.3d 686 (applying California law). 
74. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 198 (Cal. 1955).
75. Id. at 197.
76. Eastwood, 198 Cal, Rptr. at 347.
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misrepresenting a plaintiff’s authorship or attributing statements to 
him or her for the purpose of advertising some business enterprise 
may also be actionable.77 
However, even if a plantiff establishes a prima facie case, the First 
Amendment requires that the right to be protected from 
unauthorized publicity be balanced against the public interest in the 
dissemination of news and information.78  Thus, publication of matters 
in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to know 
and the freedom of the press to tell it, is not ordinarily actionable. 
This public matters exemption is a broad one; a matter in the public 
interest is not restricted to current events, and may extend to 
reproduction of past events.79  
A related tort is the right of publicity, defined by J. Thomas 
McCarthy, as “the inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”80  The right of publicity does 
not prevent mere reputational damage; it can only be used to prevent 
someone else from improperly profiting from a celebrity’s image, 
thereby preventing the celebrity from exploiting his or her own image 
in that context.81  In California, the right of publicity is protected by 
statute82 and applies almost exclusively to celebrities. The elements of 
a right of publicity claim are: (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
identity, (2) appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to the 
defendant’s commercial advantage, (3) lack of consent, and (4) 
injury.83  To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her 
“name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness” was used “on or in 
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods or 
77. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 580–81 (Cal. 1942).
78. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314–315 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002). 
79. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995), as modified, (May 30, 1995). 
80. See J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2011).
81. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §3344 (Deering 2012) (statutory right of publicity only
applies to uses for the “purposes of advertising or selling”) (emphasis added).  This 
definition has been accepted by most courts and explicitly incorporated into many of the 
right of publicity statutes.  See also, Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 
Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The right to publicity protects that value as 
property, and its infringement is a commercial, rather than a personal tort.”)  The 
Supreme Court also appears to subscribe to this definition; see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573–74 (1977). 
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2012).
83. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002). 
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services, without such person’s prior consent.”84  California courts 
have extended protection beyond name, voice and image85 to include 
a celebrity’s general “identity.”86 
The unauthorized use of a celebrity’s name, photograph, or 
likeness on a publication and in broadcasted advertisements, in 
connection with the publication of a false (but nondefamatory) 
article, is actionable under both common law87 and statutory law.88  
This type of “commercial exploitation” is not privileged or protected 
by the Constitution.89  However, a public figure can only recover 
damages for noncommercial exploitation of his or her image by 
showing that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth 
or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.90 
b. False Light
Publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye
constitutes an invasion of privacy.91 To recover under a false light 
claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly (or 
recklessly) made and publicized a false representation that would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.92  A false light claim, like 
libel, exposes a person to contempt, ridicule, or humiliation and 
assumes the audience will recognize it as such.93  The violation can 
manifest in several ways. 
For example, the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s picture to 
illustrate an article in which the plaintiff is falsely characterized may 
constitute an invasion of privacy.94  However, if a photograph is a fair 
and accurate depiction of the plaitniff in the scene in question, albeit 
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (Deering 2012).
85. Id.
86. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc, 971 F.2d 1395,  1397–99 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Super. Ct. of L.A. 1983).
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; see 6A CAL. JUR. ASSAULT AND OTHER WILLFUL 
TORTS § 133. 
89. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
90. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
91. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979); Forsher v. Bugliosi,
608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980). 
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
93. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 514–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
94. Gill v. Curtis Publ’g. Co., 239 P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1952) (holding that plaintiffs
stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on the unauthorized use of a 
photograph taken of plaintiffs in an amorous pose at their place of business and used to 
illustrate a magazine article treating various types of love in such a manner as to depict 
plaintiffs as immoral persons); M.G., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 514–15. 
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portraying the plaintiff in less than flattering light, it is not 
actionable—so long as the photograph is not highly offensive to 
persons of ordinary sensibilities.95  Similarly, falsely attributing some 
statement or belief to a plaintiff—such as the unauthorized signing of 
his or her name to a letter that would cast doubt on his or her 
character96— may may also be actionable under this tort.97   
However, publicity that places one in a false light is not 
necessarily an invasion of privacy where it discloses no fact the person 
wishes to keep secret relative to his or her private life.98  A false light 
cause of action is in substance equivalent to a libel claim99 and, 
therefore, must meet the same requirements, including notice and a 
demand for retraction as required by statute in actions for damages 
for the publication of a libel in a newspaper or of slander by a radio 
broadcast,100 and the necessity to show malice.101 
III. Analysis
The e-personation statute is susceptible to challenge under both 
the overbreadth doctrine for the phrase “harming . . . another person” 
and the vagueness doctrine for the ambiguity of the term “credibly 
impersonate” another person.   
A. Constitutional Problems
When interpreting statutes, California state courts must give
precise meaning to otherwise unconstitutionally vague terms (even if 
doing so means that a court overturns prior precedent).102  A law is 
unconstitutionally vague if it is so ambiguous and lacking in criteria 
95. Aisenson v. Am. Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
96. Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 580–581 (Cal. 1942).
97. Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197–98 (Cal. 1955).
98. Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding
that there was no invasion of privacy where defendant, the former employer of plaintiff, 
sent letters to customers for plaintiff’s type of work advising that plaintiff had been 
terminated and replaced by workers with more knowledge and experience, where the 
letter disclosed no facts relative to plaintiff’s private life, revealed no secrets of plaintiff, 
and, although it placed plaintiff in a false light by reflecting on his skill and ability, was 
defamatory only in reflecting on the professional standing of plaintiff in the public view). 
99. Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16 (Cal. 1969); Aisenson, 269 Cal. Rptr.
379, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
100. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971) (referring to
Civ. Code § 48a); Selleck v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985) (referring to Civ. Code § 48a). 
101. Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 924–25; Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 44; Selleck, 212 Cal. Rptr. at
845; Aisenson, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
102. Pryor v. Mun. Ct., 599 P.2d 636, 640–41 (Cal. 1979).
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that it not only fails to adequately describe the conduct it requires (or 
prohibits) to those who must observe it, but also allows police, judges, 
and juries to resolve basic policy matters on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the ensuing likelihood of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.103  That said, some ambiguity in statutory language is 
acceptable (and arguably inevitable), so it is not fatal if a statutory 
term or word does not have a universally recognized meaning or 
there is a matter of degree in the definition.  A statute will be deemed 
sufficiently precise if its meaning can be fairly established by 
references to similar statutes, other judicial interpretations, to the 
common law, the dictionary, or a common and generally accepted 
meaning.104 
To overcome a statutory vagueness challenge, a criminal statute 
must be definite enough to provide both a standard of conduct for 
those whose activities are proscribed as well as a standard for police 
enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt.105  Although the standards 
for certainty in a civil statute are less exacting than the standards for a 
criminal statute, both must be sufficiently clear as to give a fair 
warning of the conduct prohibited and provide a standard against 
which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts.106  Because the e-
personation statute creates both civil and criminal liability, the 
language should be held to the higher criminal standard. 
1. Analyzing the Overbreadth of “Harm”
Although Senator Simitian says the law will only be used to stop
“pernicious” attackers,107 the statute’s language is broad enough to 
allow a much more expansive application. The four purposes 
enumerated (“harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding”) 
cover a large spectrum of possibility—and the bill neither provides a 
definition for what it means to have the purpose of “harming,” nor 
clarifies if “another person” refers only to the person whose identity 
has been usurped, or includes some third party.  Because the 
103. Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68,  74–75 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969), In re H.C., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793,  794–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  See also Bowland v. 
Mun. Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 636–37 (Cal. 1976), In re Sheena K., 153 P.3d 282, 293 (Cal. 
2007). 
104. In re Mariah T., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
105. People v. Morgan, 170 P.3d 129, 137 (Cal. 2007).
106. State Bd. of Equalization v. Wirick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 925 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). 
107. STATE SENATOR JOE SIMITIAN, Fact Sheet Senate Bill 1411: Criminal “E-
Personation”, http://www.senatorsimitian.com/images/uploads/SB_1411_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
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standards for “intimidating” and “threatening” behavior are 
subjective (i.e., whether the victim believed they were in danger) and 
require only testimony of a victim’s subjective state, whereas 
“defrauding” is objective, and requires proof of monetary damages to 
recover, it is also unclear what types of harm (e.g., emotional, 
physical, or financial) are actionable, and how much harm has is 
required (or intended) for a prima facie case.  Additionally, it is 
difficult to determine exactly which acts of impersonation are 
threatening, intimidating, or defrauding, and reasonable people will 
disagree whether an impersonation falls within these categories. 
The problem under a broad definition that includes emotional or 
reputational harm, is that critical satire or parody (which are 
otherwise protected) could be actionable.  Satire is the use of irony, 
sarcasm, ridicule, or similar devices to expose, denounce, or deride 
vice and folly in a target;108 and the line between that and emotional 
or reputational harm is fuzzy at best.  The object of satire is usually to 
provoke its targets to improve or alter their behavior (at the very 
least to publicly expose their shortcomings) through ridicule—and 
therefore, is effective only when it causes its target to feel sufficiently 
embarrassed to change future behavior.109  However, embarrassment 
is not the kind of harm normally allowed as basis for a lawsuit.110  
As the law stands today, a public figure may not recover damages 
for emotional harm caused by the publication of a parody he or she 
finds offensive unless it contains a false statement of fact that satisfies 
the actual malice standard (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for truth or falsity).111  In the Hustler case, a nationally circulated 
magazine printed a parody article suggesting Jerry Falwell (a 
nationally known minister and an active political and social 
commentator) and his mother were drunks, had an incestuous 
rendezvous in an outhouse, and that Falwell was a hypocrite who only 
preached under the influence.112  That the material might be deemed 
108. Satire definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/satire (last viewed Jan. 20, 2012). 
109. Robert Harris, The Purpose and Method of Satire, (originally published Aug. 20,
1990, version date Oct. 24, 2004), http://www.virtualsalt.com/satire.htm. 
110. Corynne McSherry, “E-Personation” Bill Could Be Used to Punish Online Critics,
Undermine First Amendment Protections for Parody, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (Aug. 22, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/08/e-personation-bill-
could-be-used-punish-online; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
910 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may 
embarrass others or coerce them into action.”). 
111. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988).
112. Id. at 48.
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outrageous and that it might have been intended to cause severe 
emotional distress are not enough to overcome First Amendment 
protections.113 Vicious attacks on public figures in the form of 
cartoons, the Court noted, are part of the American tradition of satire 
and parody,114 a tradition of speech that would be hamstrung if public 
figures could sue them anytime the satirist caused distress.115 
Although the justices conceded that this ad was not technically a 
political cartoon, they were unable to find a standard that could 
separate this kind of ad from the others.116  The Court also noted that 
vague terms like “outrageousness” have an “inherent subjectiveness” 
about them, which “allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the 
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a 
particular expression.”117 
The Supreme Court recently weighed in on the balance between 
First Amendment protection of speech on matters of public concern 
made peaceably in a public space causing significant psychological 
and emotional harm to a private individual.118  The Court defined 
“matters of public concern” broadly as “a subject of general interest 
and of value and concern to the public.”119  The majority opinion in 
Snyder did suggest that personally directed harassment, such as 
speech to a small number of people, like the publication of someone’s 
sex tape, would be “private speech” and more readily amenable to 
regulation based on its content.120  Taken together, Hustler and Snyder 
suggest that the First Amendment guarantees trump the feelings of 
those harmed by speech that crosses the line into harassment, as long 
as the speech at issue concerns a public matter (which has been 
broadly defined), and that otherwise actionable speech is immunized 
by the First Amendment when interspersed with protected speech.  
Another issue with this statute is that statements of truth, albeit 
made with harmful intent, are traditionally protected against 
defamation claims, but seem to be actionable under the e-personation 
statute.  The truth defense in defamation cases rests on First 
Amendment principles that one cannot be prosecuted for saying the 
truth.  Likewise, a statement of opinion (as opposed to one of fact) is 
113. Id. at 53.
114. Id. at 54.
115. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 55.
117. Id. at 55.
118. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011).
119. Id. at 1216.
120. Id.
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protected against defamation claims.  Courts articulated a standard 
for distinguishing opinion from fact which relies on use of language 
and provability.121  For a statement to qualify as opinion, the factual 
basis of the statement must be clearly disclosed, and any statement of 
opinion without underlying facts (or implies the existence of 
undisclosed false facts) is to be treated as a per se factual assertion 
and actionable.122  False statements of fact couched in an opinion 
context are actionable unless clearly set aside by “loose, figurative or 
hyperbolic language.”123 Generally, a statement is measured “not so 
much by its effect when subjected to the critical analysis of a mind 
trained in the law, but by the natural and probable effect upon the 
mind of the average reader” in determining whether it is defamatory, 
and therefore actionable.124  Consequently, the e-personation statute 
seems to criminalize an otherwise protected activity solely on the 
basis of its medium.  For example, imagine someone created a 
“credible” fake Facebook profile for another person and used it to 
reveal embarrassing, but truthful, facts about that person with the 
intent to harm them.  Under defamation law, this conduct would not 
be actionable,  but under the e-personation law, it would. 
Finally, although Senator Simitian claims that the e-personation 
statute only updates the existing law against false personation to take 
account of the Internet, the statute actually does something slightly 
different.  In reality, this statute expands the crime to one against 
both the target of the false impersonation as well as against the person 
falsely impersonated.  Under the existing false personation statute, the 
crime is only against the person whose identity is assumed; in 
contrast, this law provides an additional civil remedy for persons who 
are harmed, intimidated, threatened, or defrauded by this 
impersonation, even if they are not the person impersonated.125  Even 
more worrisome is that under the definitions in the statute, “person” 
means not only humans, but various business forms as well.126  This 
means that if someone impersonates a corporation to satirize them, 
121. Morningstar, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 556–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
122. Morningstar, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
125. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1411 (as amended May
11, 2010), STATE OF CAL. ASSEMB. 2009–2010, available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_cfa_20100628_112759_asm_comm.html. 
126. “For purposes of this chapter, ‘person’ means a natural person, living or
deceased, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company, 
corporation, limited liability company, or public entity, or any other legal entity.”  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 530.55(a). (Deering 2012). 
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they could be liable to that company and subject to criminal 
prosecution. 
2. Analyzing the Vagueness of “Credibly”
The statute defines “credible” as “if another person would
reasonably believe, or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was 
or is the person who was impersonated.”127  According to the 
legislative history, the scope of the statute was originally much 
broader,128 and “credibly” was later added129 to narrow it so it would 
not undermine online activism and protected speech.130  The problem 
with this position is two-fold: (1) the fact that the statute provides a 
definition for “credible” is not dispositive as to its clarity, and (2) 
“credibility” is inherently subjective and therefore a poor standard by 
which to objectively judge conduct. 
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court found that, “just because a 
definition including [several] limitations is not vague, it does not 
follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague.”131  
In that case, the Court unanimously voted to strike down portions of 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) for violating the First 
Amendment132 because the “many ambiguities”133 of the language in 
the Act regarding the scope of its coverage “lack[ed] the precision 
that the First Amendment requires” when regulating content of 
speech.134  The justices found the undefined terms “indecent” and 
“patently offensive” problematic because they “provoke uncertainty 
among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and 
just what they mean.”135  The vagueness of content-based regulation, 
combined with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute, 
raised special First Amendment concerns for the Justices because of 
its “obvious chilling effect on free speech.”136  The Court also found 
that this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the “risk of 
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b) (Deering 2012).
128. CAL. S., S.B. 1411, INTRODUCED, CAL. S. 2009–2010, available at http://leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_bill_20100219_introduced.pdf. 
129. CAL. S., S.B. 1411, AMENDED (APR. 28, 2010), CAL. S. 2009–2010, April 28, 2010,
available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1411_bill_20100428_ 
amended_sen_v97.pdf. 
130. Simitian, supra note 4.
131. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997).
132. Id. at 883.
133. Id. at 870.
134. Id. at 874.
135. Id. at 871–72.
136. Id.
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discriminatory enforcement” of vague regulations, poses greater First 
Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil regulation”137  
The “vague contours” of the Act’s scope “unquestionably silences 
some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional 
protection,” and that the Act’s burden on protected speech “cannot 
be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted 
statute.”138 
In another case, the Court struck down on vagueness grounds a 
criminal statute defining a person as a “gangster” if he was without 
lawful employment, had been either convicted at least three times for 
disorderly conduct or had been convicted of any other crime, and was 
“known to be a member of a gang of two or more persons.”139  The 
Court observed that neither common law nor the statute gave the 
words “gang” or “gangster” definite meaning, that the enforcing 
agencies and courts were free to construe the terms broadly or 
narrowly, and that the phrase “known to be a member” was 
ambiguous.140 
Although the e-personation statute incorporates the “reasonable 
person” standard (which measures conduct against a hypothetical 
person who “exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence and judgment that society requires of its members for the 
protection of their own and of others’ interests”),141 this definition 
does not elucidate any sort of objective workable criteria which would 
make someone’s online portrayal of another credible.  There is a 
fundamental problem with the qualifier “credibly,” in that it is 
virtually impossible to assess someone’s belief against an objective, 
“reasonable” person because such evaluations will always be context-
based and fact-specific.  Even if one were to accept this subjective 
standard—the bill doesn’t define who “another person” (to whom the 
impersonation must seem credible) is: someone with personal 
knowledge of the impersonation victim or a third party without such 
knowledge who stumbles across the impersonation?  This matters 
because the degree to which someone knows the victim will guide 
whether they find the impersonation credible or not.  A plain 
language reading of the e-personation statute would allow an 
137. Id. at 872.
138. Id. at 874.
139. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454–455 (1939).
140. Id. at 458.
141. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s comments that the
reasonable person “acts sensibly, does things without serious delay, and takes proper but 
not excessive precautions.” 
 2012] PARODY OR IDENTITY THEFT 297
individual to bring a lawsuit merely because a stranger was duped by 
an impersonation that, to anyone with personal knowledge of the 
plaintiff, would not be credible—regardless of whether any actual 
harm resulted. 
Finally, the argument that credibility is a sufficient filter to protect 
free speech misses the point—successful parody, for example, 
depends on initial credibility.  A parody is a work created to mock, 
comment on, or make fun of an original work, its subject, author, 
style, or some other target, by means of imitation.  Parody can 
provide a nuanced means for expressing critical sentiments and for 
openly exploring controversial subjects, but it often depends heavily 
on the readers ability to identify and understand the irony in the work 
because the device does not work when blatantly labeled as such. 
This subtlety that gives parody its utility also contributes to its 
greatest drawback: Implied meanings are often lost on their intended 
audience.  In textual communication this difficulty is magnified by the 
absence of any nonverbal queues that might imply a nonliteral 
interpretation. 
As an example of just how easy it is for something that is clearly a 
parody to be considered “credible” by another person, consider the 
suspension and subsequent removal of the @ceoSteveJobs Twitter 
account.142  The account churned out tongue-in-cheek tweets poking 
fun at Apple (and its late founder) such as, “It’s official.  The iPad 
now comes in greater variety than my clothing.”143  “When Chuck 
Norris holds the iPhone 4 the signal increases,”144 and “Women love 
playing with my nano.”145  It seems unlikely that anyone familiar with 
Steve Jobs or Apple, Inc. (and its notoriously well-controlled public 
relations department) could reasonably believe that this account was 
genuine.  But in fact, someone did—on July 28, 2010, the Daily Mail, 
(the United Kingdom’s second largest newspaper) quoted the account 
as the real Steve Jobs in a story about customer dissatisfaction with 
142. On March 1, 2011, Twitter suspended the @ceoSteveJobs Twitter account (which
had approximately 460,000 followers and more than 650 tweets at the time of deletion) 
and renamed it @fakeceoSteve. Don Reisinger, Twitter Suspends Fake Steve Jobs Account, 
Then Backtracks, CNET NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011, 7:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
13506_3-20038220-17.html. 
143. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/FakeceoSteve/status/4307866
7148066816 (now defunct). 
144. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/ceoSteveJobs/status/20794014540
(now defunct). 
145. Twitter status, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/#!/ceoSteveJobs/status/3759037
5245950976 (now defunct). 
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the iPhone 4146 despite the fact that the account’s biography explicitly 
stated it was a parody.147  This illustrates the pitfalls of the “credible” 
standard as defined in the statute; even where the parody was labeled, 
a professional and well-established news outlet could be—and 
actually was—mistaken about the veracity of a parody account.  
The Yes Men, a group of political activists, provide an example of 
the kind of political speech that may be chilled by the e-personation 
statute.  The Yes Men impersonate entities that they dislike (typically 
corporations and public officials) in a practice they call “identity 
correction” to raise awareness of what they consider problematic 
social and political issues.148  And, illustrating the concern that overly 
sensitive litigants may abuse this new law, the targets of the criticism 
have responded with aggressive legal threats and lawsuits.149  For 
example, in October 2009, The Yes Men issued a press release and 
staged a press conference as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which 
the Chamber ostensibly reversed its position and promised to stop 
lobbying against strong climate change legislation.150  The hoax fooled 
a lot of reporters and attracted a lot of media attention.151  As part of 
the stunt, The Yes Men published a parody website152 resembling the 
Chamber’s, which featured a fake statement by chief executive officer 
Thomas J. Donahue about the supposed change of policy.153  In the 
middle of the press conference, a Chamber of Commerce 
representative rushed into the room and revealed that the Chamber’s 
position on climate change legislation had not in fact changed.  
Afterwards, the Chamber of Commerce aggressively took action, 
first sending a takedown notice under the Digital Milenium Copyright 
Act to The Yes Men’s upstream service provider demanding removal 
of the parody website (which was later disputed), then filing suit in 
federal district court against members of The Yes Men for trademark 
146. Charles Arthur, Daily Mail Fooled by Fake Steve Jobs Tweet on iPhone 4 Recall,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 28, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/jun/27/daily-
mail-twitter-jobs-iphone-mistake. 
147. The biography section read, “I don’t care what you think of me.  You care what I
think of you.  Of course this is a parody account.” Id. 
148. THE YES MEN, http://theyesmen.org/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
149. McSherry, supra note 111.
150. Chamber of Commerce Goes Green, THE YES MEN, http://theyesmen.org/hijinks/
chamber (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). 
151. Lisa Lerer & Micael Calderone, CNBC, Reuters Fall for Climate Hoax, POLITICO
(Oct. 19, 2009, 2:44 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28456.html. 
152. Chamber of Commerce parody site, THE YES MEN, http://www.chamber-of-
commerce.us/090118tjd_prosperity.html (now defunct). 
153. Chamber of Commerce Goes Green, THE YES MEN, supra 133.
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claims of infringement, dilution, cybersquatting, and false 
advertising.154 On January 5, 2010, The Yes Men filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint (arguing that the Chamber’s lawsuit is designed 
to punish core political speech, rather than to vindicate any actual 
trademark harm) and a motion to stay discovery.155  As of publication 
of this Note, the case is still pending in court. 
B. Preclusion Concerns
Section 528.5 makes a point of not precluding any other claims,156
which raises concerns about potential abuse by prosecutors and 
plaintiffs.  The statute provides harsh penalties; in addition to any 
other civil remedy available, a person who suffers damage or loss 
because of online impersonation may, within three years of discovery 
by plaintiff,157 bring a civil action against the violator for 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief 
related to costs incurred by plaintiff,158 reasonable attorney’s fees,159 
punitive or exemplary damages160 (upon showing of oppression, fraud, 
or malice by defendant),161 and possible forfeiture of materials owned 
by the defendant and used in conjunction with the impersonation.162  
Since this law does not preclude any other causes of action, plaintiffs 
and prosecutors are almost certainly going to plead multiple, 
simultaneous causes of action based on the same conduct, such that 
this law could easily be used as a gap-filler, or lower threshold crime, 
154. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Yes Men, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/us-chamber-commerce-v-yes-men (last visited on Feb. 
27, 2011). Court filings for Chamber of Commerce v. Sevrin are available at 
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2009cv02014/139111/. 
155. U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Yes Men, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://
www.citmedialaw.org/threats/us-chamber-commerce-v-yes-men (last visited on Feb. 27, 
2011). 
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(f) (Deering 2012).
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(5) (Deering 2012).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1) (Deering 2012).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(2) (Deering 2012).
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(4) (Deering 2012).
161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (c) (Deering 2012), defining: (1) “Malice” as “conduct
which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct 
which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or 
safety of others;” (2) “Oppression” as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel 
and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights;” and (3) “Fraud” as “an 
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the 
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of 
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” 
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(g) (Deering 2012).
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to find liability on a lower (noneconomic) harm standard for conduct 
that would not have been actionable otherwise. 
IV. Proposal
Ideally, the e-personation statute should be repealed—or 
amended—by the legislature before anyone is tried under the law. 
Despite the vagueness and overbreadth issues discussed above, a 
reviewing court is unlikely to strike the law in its entirety because it is 
not facially invalid—there is a core of conduct proscribed that is not 
protected speech—and will instead attempt to interpret the statutory 
language to more clearly define what it means to “credibly” 
impersonate someone, and to set the threshold of “harming . . . 
another person.”  
California statutory interpretation doctrine states that where the 
plain meaning of statutory text is insufficient to interpret it, courts 
should look to the legislative intent behind the statute, then to other 
extrinsic sources.  If possible, all statutes relating to the same subject 
(or having the same general purpose) should be read together so that 
they harmonize and achieve a uniform and consistent legislative 
purpose.163  When deciphering the intended meaning of a statutory 
phrase, courts should look to the same or similar language in related 
statutes and give the same interpretation to the phrase at issue.164  
Because the plain meaning of the e-personation statute’s text is 
unclear, this section will propose a narrower and more precise 
understanding of the statute using the legislature’s intent, the 
meaning of the statute as a whole, and similar language in analogous 
statutes. 
A. Limiting the Meaning of “Harming Another Person”
The phrase “harming . . . another person” is not clear on its face,
and the definition does not further elucidate its meaning.165  The use 
of “harm” as an umbrella term suggests that the legislature intended 
its meaning to be broader than the other enumerated intents 
(intimidating, threatening or defrauding); but it is unclear whether it 
163. 58 CAL JUR 3D STATUTES § 123; see also Kendall-Brief Co. v. Super. Ct., 131 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Isobe v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 526 
P.2d 528, 532 (Cal. 1974)).
164. 58 CAL JUR 3D STATUTES § 123; see In re Do Kyung K., 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 36
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
165. The definition of “harm” is, “injury, loss or detriment.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 722 (7th ed. 1999). 
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means emotional, reputational, physical or economic harm—or some 
combination thereof.  The provision in subsection (e) suggests that it 
means at least economic harm.166  Because the phrase “harm” does 
not appear anywhere else in Chapter 8 of the Penal Code, reviewing 
courts should consider similar language in related statutes. 
Determining what interest the statute aims to protect is necessary 
in resolving how harm should be defined.  Using the analogous legal 
claims summarized in Part II as a guide, there are three possible 
approaches to defining “harm,” depending on the interest protected. 
The first interpretation limits the protected interest, and consequently 
harm, to the specific examples provided in the false personation 
statute—exposing someone to actual or potential legal or financial 
liability.  The second interpretation broadens the protected interest to 
include the privacy and identity of the individual impersonated such 
that it presumes harm from the impersonation alone, much like 
existing invasion of privacy torts.  The third interpretation is 
somewhere in between the first two and protects reputational and 
emotional interests of impersonation victims (in the same manner as 
IIED and defamation claims), and reflects the fact that the legislature 
felt that the existing statutes were not sufficient to address the issue. 
There are two bits of evidence supporting this first approach to 
interpreting “harm” (specifically, limiting it to the specific examples 
provided in the false personation statute—essentially exposing 
someone to at least the possibility of legal or financial liability).  The 
first is that Senator Simitian, the author of the bill, stated that his 
intent was to merely update the existing law to reflect the 
technological advances made since it was enacted in 1892.167  The 
second is that doing so would maintain consistency with the 
neighboring statutes, and help achieve a consistent legislative 
purpose.168  
However, several differences in the application and scope of the 
statutes suggest that this construction of the legislature’s intent is not 
the most appropriate.  First, under both the false personation and 
identity theft statutes, the crime (i.e., harm) is only against the person 
whose identity is assumed.  The e-personation statute, on the other 
hand, expands the crime to one against both the target of the false 
166.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(e) (Deering 2012).
167. Simitian I, supra note 3.
168. The e-personation statute is codified in Chapter Eight of the Penal Code (False
Personation and Cheats §§ 528–539) between the false personation and identity theft 
statutes. 
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impersonation as well as against the person falsely impersonated.  In 
other words, the e-personation statute provides an additional civil 
remedy for persons who are harmed, intimidated, threatened, or 
defrauded by this impersonation, even if they are not the person 
impersonated.169  Another complication is that the existing statute 
does not expressly exclude acts carried out over the Internet, so there 
is nothing to suggest that the law would not already apply in that 
context;170 further, if the intent was to update the existing statute, it 
could have been amended to explicitly allow online impersonations. 
Lastly, under the false personation statute, a plaintiff must establish, 
in addition to the fake impersonation, an additional act that created 
at least the possibility of bringing financial or legal liability upon the 
victim or benefit to someone—either the impersonator or a third 
party.  The e-personation statute requires only intent to harm, not 
actual (or potential) damage, like the existing statutes.  For these 
reasons, it’s reasonable to assume that the legislature intended a 
different, or at least broader, meaning for “harm” than the one 
outlined here.  Therefore, to determine which of the other two 
interpretations is correct, it is imperative to determine the interest 
being protected—either the integrity of the impersonation victim’s 
peace of mind (as in the privacy torts) or the victim’s reputation and 
standing in his or her community in the wake of the impersonation (as 
with defamation claims).  Both options are considered in turn. 
The fact that the e-personation statute requires only intent to 
harm—whether or not someone is actually harmed, (or intimidated, 
threatened, or defrauded) is irrelevant—supports the interpretation 
that harm of being falsely impersonated is inextricable from the act; 
the injury is in the violation of the identity and privacy of the 
individual impersonated, the same principle behind the invasion of 
privacy torts.  The wrong inflicted by an invasion of privacy is a direct 
injury to the plaintiff’s feelings and peace of mind, and compensation 
is awarded for that injury, as opposed to any reputational damage 
resulting from the invasion.  For example, to recover under a false 
light claim, a plaintiff must only prove that the defendant knowingly 
(or recklessly) made and publicized a false representation which 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; actual injury is 
169. ASSEM. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 126.
170. “For purposes of this chapter, ‘personal identifying information’ means any . . .
unique electronic data including information identification number assigned to the person, 
address or routing code, telecommunication identifying information or access device.” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (Deering 2012). 
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irrelevant—it is presumed.171  The strongest argument supporting 
application of this standard is that it lowers the threshold of 
actionable harm for the victim, which seemed to be what Sen. 
Simitian wanted to do, and that courts balance this lower threshold of 
harm against First Amendment protections for dissemination of 
information and matters of publics interest.172  However, this is 
probably not the correct understanding for several reasons.  First, the 
harm only extends to the person whose identity is usurped, which may 
or may not be the person to whom the harm was intended.  Further, 
while the false light claim is a relatively good fit for e-personation, the 
misappropriation and right of publicity claims are fundamentally 
about protecting victims’ economic interests.  Finally, if adopted, it 
would essentially make moot the issue of harm, since it would be 
presumed by the intentional act of impersonation, and would 
therefore make any impersonation actionable.   
Therefore, the third construction, which interprets “harm” to 
include both reputational and emotional harm is probably the most 
accurate representation of the legislature’s intent.  Defamation and 
IIED are the legal causes of action to address reputational and 
emotional harm; both of which logically follow from the discovery of 
a malicious impersonation and the consequential damage done to 
one’s reputation in its wake.  They are also appropriate because 
defamation law contains a broad exception for matters of public 
interest and IIED claims require a high threshold of proof, the 
adoption of which would help balance the statute with First 
Amendment principles.  However, there are still problems; these legal 
theories, unlike e-personation, are predicated on the fact that harm 
has actually occurred and that it was significant, or at least 
measurable.  Under the defamation statute, a plaintiff must establish, 
in addition to publication and falsity, that the statement actually 
injured the plaintiff’s reputation (with the specific exceptions of libel 
per se).  Under the IIED statute, the victim must establish, in 
addition to the defendant’s intent, outrageous conduct and proximate 
cause, that they were actually seriously emotionally distraught, and 
physically manifested this distress.  In contrast, the e-personation 
statute requires only intent, and provides no minimum threshold for 
the harm intended.  Trying to devise a complementary standard here 
is difficult because what matters with defamation and IIED is how 
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
172. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), review denied, (Mar. 27, 2002). 
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much harm resulted, not how much was intended.  For example, 
imagine a situation in which someone creates a realistic fake 
Facebook page for someone else without their consent and makes 
false factual statements on it, but no one ever actually sees it, so 
neither the intended target’s reputation or emotional state is harmed. 
A lawsuit alleging defamation or IIED under those facts would 
probably not succeed, but an e-personation claim well might. “E-
personators” who are caught will claim that they didn’t intend to 
harm (threaten, intimidate, or defraud) anyone through their actions, 
and intent is difficult to prove, especially without the linked 
requirement of actual damage.  Despite these problems, this 
interpretation is ultimately the most resasonable because it reflects 
the fact that the legislature felt the actionable harm in the existing 
statutes did not sufficiently address the problem, but does not create a 
situation in which the minimum harm threshold would be negligible. 
Even so, this interpreation sets up the statute for conflict with 
established First Amendment principles.173 
B. Clearly Defining  “Credibly Impersonate”
Even with clearer limits to the definition of “harm,” the problem
of what it means to “credibly” impersonate someone remains.  The 
main question that must be addressed regarding the standard of 
credibility is the relationship between the individual impersonated 
and who must find the impersonation credible.  Because credibility is 
such a nebulous and inherently subjective standard, courts should 
create strict limits on the audience to whom the impersonation must 
be believable.  The statute bill does not define exactly who “another 
person” is—i.e., to whom the impersonation must seem credible; 
someone with personal knowledge of the impersonation victim or a 
stranger who stumbles across the impersonation?  This matters 
because the degree to which someone knows the victim will guide 
whether they find the impersonation credible or not.  The two most 
obvious limits would be based on relationship to the victim or 
geographic boundaries of the audience.  The problem with limiting 
the audience geographically (say, to a 100-mile radius of the victim, or 
his or her state of residence, etc.) is that the nature of the internet 
makes those geographic distances meaningless.  Limiting the 
audience by the strength of their relationship to the victim has its own 
set of challenges: (1) where the line should be drawn; (2) how it 
should even be evaluated in the first place; (3) whether there should 
173. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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be some sliding scale reflecting the inverse relationship between 
personal knowledge of the victim and believability of the 
impersonation or just a bright line rule; and (4) whether future or 
likely contacts should be considered. 
Because he meaning of “credibly” is not clear on its face, its 
definition in the statute does not shed much light on how it should be 
applied either,174  and the word appears only once in Penal Code 
Chapter 8, courts should consider similar causes of action in 
interpreting the phrase.  One legal theory to consider is intentional 
misrepresentation, which requires a minimum level of credibility for a 
fraudulent represenation to be actionable.  Under this statute and 
related common law, the sophistication of the victim plays a role in 
determining whether his or her reliance on the fraudulent statement 
was reasonable; however, even an unsophisticated victim “may not 
put faith in representations which are preposterous, or which are 
shown by facts within his observation to be so patently and obviously 
false that he must have closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the 
truth.”175  A plain language reading of the e-personation statute, 
however, would allow an individual to bring a claim because a 
stranger was fooled by an impersonation that (and regardless of 
whether or not they relied on it), to anyone with personal knowledge 
of the plaintiff, would not be credible.  There are still people who 
believe that a Nigerian prince would like to share his fortune with 
them,176 if only they could wire him $5,000 to access it.177  The naïveté 
of a few people should not override guaranteed protections for 
speech.   
Whether reliance on a statement is reasonable or not is generally 
considered a matter of fact for a jury to decide.  However, intentional 
misrepresentation is a purely civil cause of action, so the fact that it is 
more fact-specific is permissible.  E-personation, on the other hand, is 
a criminal offense and requires a higher standard of specificity.  For 
example, California’s counterfeit official document law provides some 
specific, objective standards to help determine what would be 
considered a plausible counterfeit document by limiting the meaning 
174. “For purposes of this section, an impersonation is credible if another person
would reasonably believe, or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was or is the 
person who was impersonated.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b) (Deering 2012). 
175. Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 981 (Cal. 1941).
176. Anna Song, Woman Out $400K to ‘Nigerian Scam’ Con Artists, KATU.COM
(Nov. 21, 2008, 4:30 AM), http://www.katu.com/news/34292654.html. 
177. Nigerian Scam, SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/fraud/advancefee/nigeria.
asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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of “purport” to “by virtue of the wording or appearance thereon could 
reasonably deceive an ordinary person into believing that it is issued 
by a government agency.”178  While those standards are not necessarily 
transferrable to electronic platforms, similar objective standards as to 
what would make an impersonation credible could help cure the 
vagueness problem with that term. 
Any objective standard must acknowledge the paradoxical fact 
that the more outrageous, out of character, or damaging an 
impersonation, the less credible it will be to anyone who actually 
knows the victim, and the less likely it is to be believable.  Guardino 
himself articulated this idea in the newspaper article for which he was 
interviewed: “It could have ruined my reputation .. . . Luckily, [the e-
mail recipients] know me well enough to know that e-mail was out of 
character.”179 
A trademark infringement case for online impersonation from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals illustrates how trademark law may 
provide an appropriate paradigm for evaluating the credibility of 
impersonation claims in this medium.  In that case, the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) brought an action alleging that Gahary’s 
unauthorized use of variations of the name of its CEO (Richard 
Grasso) to post offensive messages to stock-related Internet bulletin 
boards violated the Lanham Act and state law.180  The court found 
that the use was non-infringing because, “here, both the sheer 
outrageousness of Gahary’s messages, as well as the particular place 
he chose to post them, paradoxically bolster defendants’ claim that 
Gahary’s intention could not have been to impersonate Grasso.”181  
According to the court, “the more participants there are on 
RagingBull.com who use such celebrity screen names, the less likely 
readers should be to confuse the author of a message posted under a 
famous alias.”182  The Gahary opinion reiterated that the law is clear 
that “First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who 
speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed,”183 
and that Supreme Court has long cautioned judges against the 
temptation to act too readily as arbiters of taste or effectiveness 
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.5 (a).
179. Koskey, supra note 6.
180. New York Stock Exch. v. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
181. Id. at 406.
182. Id. at 411.
183. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
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where expression such as parody is concerned.184  While the Gahary 
decision was about a public figure (whose name had arguably 
acquired a secondary meaning), the principle behind it—that forum, 
context, and content matter when determining credibility—is equally 
applicable to private individuals.   
While the Gahary court did not “engage in any systematic 
analysis” of the likelihood of confusion question (because the parties’ 
briefs did not address it in sufficient detail), the opinion did discuss 
some general points about the relationship between parody 
impersonation and likelihood of confusion.185  While e-personation 
and trademark law protect different interests, the overlap between 
the two on the issue of parody impersonation suggests the eight-factor 
Polaroid test for likelihood of confusion (or selected elements of it) 
might provide a fairly reasonable preliminary framework for 
evaluating credibility objectively. 186   The Polaroid factors are: (1) the 
strength of the mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the two 
marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the 
prior owner will “bridge the gap,” (5) actual confusion, (6) the 
defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark, (7) the quality of the 
defendant’s product, and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.187  For 
example, adopting some variation of first, second, fifth, sixth, and 
eighth elements would be a good start. This sort of test would still 
require courts (and juries) to not only evaluate these elements, but 
also to balance them against each other—which does create potential 
for abuse—but literally any objective standards to provide guidance 
in determining what it means to “credibly impersonate another 
person” would be an improvement over the current definition. 
Adopting a two-tiered system for public and private figures 
establishing credibility is another possible way to limit abuse of the e-
personation statute by overly sensitive plaintiffs. Under this system, 
public figures would have to prove that the offending impersonation 
was especially credible, or more likely to be believed, than a private 
figure would—in the same way that public figures must show actual 
malice to prevail on a defamation claim.  Public figures have more 
resources at their disposal, like access to media and the public’s 
interest and attention in the first place, to debunk the impersonation. 
184. Id. at 582.
185. Gahary, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
186. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
187. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 1995) citing
Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495. 
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Further, as a social norm, satirical impersonations and parody 
accounts of public figures on social networking sites have become 
relatively common, to the extent that both Twitter and Facebook 
offer “verified” accounts for certain public figures so that fans know 
they are “following” or “liking” the real thing, not an imposter.188  
Ultimately, the crux of the problem with a standard of credible 
impersonation online is that when you represent yourself through the 
facets of the Internet that come into play here (e.g., a social 
networking or media site, forum chat, email address, blog, or 
website), there is no “official” stamp of approval for your identity 
because the vast majority of hosting platforms do not authenticate 
users’ identities.  In other words, on the Internet, nobody knows 
you’re a dog.189  Moreover, the hosting website and platforms have no 
feasible way to authenticate the identities of their users. California’s 
identity theft statute limits itself to any document purporting to be 
government-issued identification, or birth or baptism certificate.190  
because we as a society rely on official, government-issued 
documentation to verify identity as opposed to allowing people to 
make up their own.  No store selling alcohol will take someone 
claiming to be 21 at their word, nor will they accept a homemade 
identity card as proof of legal age.  This inability to authenticate 
“real-world” identity means that people who use the Internet should 
be, and largely are, skeptical that people are not who they represent 
themselves to be.191 
Senator Simitian is correct that malicious online impersonation is 
a real and growing problem.  However, privately owned social media 
hosting platforms are better equipped to deal with the problem than 
the government.  For one thing, private platforms are in a far better 
position to determine what it means to “credibly impersonate” 
someone because they are more aware of the telling contextual signs 
of what would make an impersonation credible on their particular 
188. About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-
basics/topics/111-features/articles/119135-about-verified-accounts (last visited Feb. 15, 
2012); Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Verified Accounts and Pseudonyms, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/15/facebook-verified-
accounts-alternate-names/. 
189. Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, THE NEW YORKER,
July 5, 1993, at 61 (cartoon) available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/jomc/ 
academics/dri/idog.html. 
190. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 529a, 529.5 (a) (Deering 2012).
191. For example, journalists have developed guides to help their peers authenticate
tweets.  See Craig Kanalley, How to Verify a Tweet, TWITTERJOURNALISM.COM, (Jun. 25, 
2009) http://www.twitterjournalism.com/2009/06/25/how-to-verify-a-tweet/. 
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platform.  Further, while Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”) immunizes providers and users of an “interactive 
computer service” who publish information provided by others, 
essentially prohibiting the government from requiring private 
platforms to monitor and be held liable for content posted on them,192 
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Yahoo!, and MySpace (among others) 
have implemented impersonation policies and mechanisms for those 
whose identities have been stolen to flag the offending profile and 
request its removal.193    The fact that these platforms have voluntarily 
established impersonation policies shows that they take the problem 
seriously even in the absence of legal obligation.  But most 
importantly, if private companies, in implementing their policies, err 
on the side of caution, they cannot be sued for violating free speech.    
This principle is illustrated in the contrast between Twitter’s 
treatment of the @ceoSteveJobs194 and @BPGlobalPR195 accounts.  
The @BPBlobal PR account, which sprung up in the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in April 
2010, churned out satirical tweets such as, “Sadly we can no longer 
certify our oil as Dolphin Safe,”196 and “You know what they say 
about the ocean... Once it goes black it never goes back! JOKING- 
the water is brown,”197 and “@Jesus walked on water and soon you 
can too! (Please pray for BP, we’re losing a lot of oil).”198  Although  a 
spokesperson for British Petroleum stated that it was clear the 
account was a parody,199 many people were confused and outraged by 
the account’s sardonic tweets.200  Twitter did not take any action 
against the BPGlobal PR account.  In contrast, Twitter required the 
@ceoSteve Jobs account to change its name (at the request of Apple) 
192. 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1).
193.  Jacob Share, Reference: Impersonation Policies for Top Social Networks,
PERSONAL BRANDING BLOG, (Nov. 6, 2009, 5:15 AM) 
http://www.personalbrandingblog.com/reference-impersonation-policies-for-top-social-
networks/. 
194.   See supra, notes 142-47.
195. BP Global PR Account Page, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR.
196. Twitter status, TWITTER,  https://twitter.com/#!/bpglobalpr/status/14456229115.
197. Twitter status, TWITTER,  https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR/status/14519730735.
198. Twitter status, TWITTER,  https://twitter.com/#!/BPGlobalPR/status/14639541783.
199. SciTechBlog, Fake BP Twitter Feed Mocks Company Over Oil Spill, CNN.com
(May 26, 2010) http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2010/05/26/fake-bp-twitter-feed-mocks-
company-over-oil-spill/. 
200. Juli Weiner, Somehow, the Internet Appears Not to Understand “BPGlobalPR”
Twitter is a Joke, VF Daily (May 24, 2010, 12:45 PM) http://www.vanityfair.com/ 
online/daily/2010/05/somehow-the-internet-appears-not-to-understand-bpglobalpr-twitter-
is-a-joke. 
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to “@fakeSteveJobs”  just days after the e-personation law went into 
effect201 (the account was eventually deleted after the passing of Steve 
Jobs in October 2011).  The similarities between the two accounts is 
striking, and the disparate treatment can be chalked up to only one 
thing: Apple’s request to have the account parodying its CEO 
account shut down, days after the e-personation statute’s enactment. 
This example also illustrates the validity of the concern that 
companies will use the statute as an opportunity to stifle criticism and 
traditionally protected commentary. 
V. Conclusion
While this law is an admirable attempt to combat cyberbullying, 
digital identity theft, and online harassment, it is too broadly and 
vaguely written.  The behavior that is unquestionably not protected is 
already addressed by other statutes with established bodies of law 
behind them (and no reason to think they are not applicable in the 
digital world), while the conduct that is possibly protected is best 
addressed by the privately owned and managed platforms that host it. 
Courts have long recognized that “where a vague statute ‘abut[s] 
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates 
to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.’ Uncertain meanings 
inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . 
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”202   
Ultimately, there are already effective laws on the books to deter 
all of the truly harmful behavior the e-personation law is intended to 
address—in particular, various forms of impersonation, defamation, 
identity theft, intimidation, harassment, fraud, and invasion of 
privacy.  Senator Simitian believes the e-personation statute is needed 
to extend those crimes to cover the use of “Internet Web sites” and 
“other electronic means,” but there is no reason to believe that the 
technology used is any bar to prosecutions under existing law—in 
fact, the use of electronic communications to commit the acts would 
extend the possible criminal laws that apply, since electronic 
communications are generally considered interstate commerce and 
thus subject to federal as well as state laws. 
Another existing statute, cyberstalking, has proved to be 
particularly effective against some instances of online impersonation. 
The Los Angeles District Attorney’s office convicted a man of 
201. Alexia Tsotsis, Apple Goes After The Parody @CeoSteveJobs Twitter Account,
TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 6, 2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/06/apple-twitter/. 
202. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
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violating California’s cyberstalking laws when he falsely 
impersonated a woman who had rejected his romantic advances in 
various chat rooms.203  Statutes such as these are more appropriate to 
bring suit and prosecute under because they have established 
standards and well-defined protected interests to guide courts in their 
application.  
In short, the e-personation statute covers very little new behavior, 
but, because of ambiguous and broad language, could be used as a 
tool to intimidate those engaging in protected speech but without the 
resources to defend themselves against litigious plaintiffs and 
overzealous prosecutors eager to set an example.  Even with a saving 
construction of the term “harm,” the question of what, exactly, it 
means to “credibly impersonate” someone on the Internet is fatal. 
For an impersonation to be damaging would, in most cases, mean that 
it was also not credible; the inverse relationship between the two 
concepts makes the law so narrowly applicable to the proscribed 
conduct that to have any teeth, its terms must be construed so broadly 
that they butt up against protected speech.   
The e-personation statute should have been written more 
specifically to target the types of activities it wants to prohibit and 
exclude the constitutionally protected activities it does target.  Given 
the Court’s trend of expanding the scope of recognized protected 
speech, it is likely that this law, if properly challenged, will fail on 
First Amendment grounds.  There are two feasible solutions here. 
The first is to go back to the drawing board and come up with an 
objective set of metrics (similar to those in the identity theft statute or 
trademark likelihood of confusion test) that could be applied to 
evaluate credibility.  The alternative is to reinstate the old system, in 
which individuals who are being impersonated report the offending 
profile directly to the platform to have it removed, then, if warranted, 
sue the profile’s creator for defamation, invasion of privacy, 
cyberbullying, (or any of the other applicable causes of action). 
203. He posed as the woman in a number of chat rooms telling other “chatters” that
she fantasized about being raped.  He provided her phone number and address so that 
people wishing to fulfill her fantasy could actually do so.  On at least six occasions, 
sometimes in the middle of the night, men knocked on the woman’s door saying they 
wanted to rape her.  The former security guard pleaded guilty in April 1999 to one count 
of stalking and three counts of solicitation of sexual assault.  He faces up to six years in 
prison.  1999 Report on Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and 
Industry, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1999), http://www.justice.gov 
/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2003). 
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There is bad behavior to deter, but this law as it stands currently is 
too sloppily drafted to pass constitutional muster. 
